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Abstract
We evaluate Japan’s inward and outward FDI performance using theoretical bench-
marks based on the premise that management teams headquartered around the
world bid for the production facilities located in each country. Our model incorpo-
rates the assumption that bids are inversely proportionate to distance. It accurately
predicts the multilateral shares of FDI stocks for most important countries. The
theory predicts lower shares of FDI for Japan than its share of the world econ-
omy. Japan’s actual share of outward FDI exceeds its inward share—as the model
predicts—but both currently lie below the benchmark predictions.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F210; F230
Key words: Foreign direct investment, gravity, mergers and acquisitions, openness
1 Introduction
During the 1980s, Japanese multinationals became some of the world’s most
prominent outward investors. However, Japan—the world’s second largest
economy—continued to host only meagre amounts of foreign direct investment
(FDI). Was Japan an overachiever for outward FDI and an underachiever for
inward FDI?
With regard to FDI, Japan is recognized as a large source country but has been
under pressure to increase its inward FDI based on the premise that it is too
∗ Corresponding Author. Address: 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T1Z2,
Canada. Tel: (604) 822-8493. Fax: (604) 822-8477.
Email addresses: keith.head@ubc.ca (Keith Head), john.ries@ubc.ca (John
Ries).
Preprint submitted to J. Japanese Int. Economies 29 December 2004low. The Japanese government has responded to this pressure and expended
considerable resources to increase FDI into Japan. Two examples of such ef-
forts are the Japanese External Trade Organization hwww.investjapan.orgi
that provides information on opportunities to potential investors and new
legislation facilitating the acquisition of Japanese ﬁrms.
An assessment of whether a country makes “too many” or “too few” inter-
national transactions requires a benchmark of cross-border activity derived
from sound theory. This paper uses a simple model of FDI to generate pre-
dictions of a country’s share of world FDI based on the size of its economy
and its size-weighted proximity to potential host and source countries. We use
the analogy of darts as management teams targeting production units, whose
international distribution corresponds to areas on a dartboard. After compil-
ing a data set covering 181 countries from 1980–2002, we use the dartboard
model to construct benchmark predictions for FDI. This allows us to assess
how well actual FDI patterns conform to the model and examine how Japan’s
FDI performance relative to the benchmark has evolved over time.
Studies of Japan’s trade pattern illustrate the value of judging performance
through the lens of a theoretical benchmark. For Japanese imports, some have
argued that the Japanese market is eﬀectively closed because its ratio of man-
ufacturing imports to GDP is lower than other industrialized countries. How-
ever, this conclusion has not held up once theory is applied. Saxonhouse (1993)
estimates a theoretical model that refutes this contention by showing that
Japan’s distinctive trade structure can be explained by its pattern of factor
endowments. More recently, Harrigan (2003) uses a gravity model to show
that Japan’s “normalized” (for market size) imports from the United States
are higher than U.S. imports from Japan. Head, Ries and Spencer (2004)
apply a model incorporating the relationship-speciﬁc investment of input sup-
pliers to U.S. auto parts trade and ﬁnd Japan imports about what the model
predicts.
Critics point to Japan’s low level of inward FDI relative to GDP as evidence of
too little investment in Japan (see Fukao and Amano, 2003). Other’s have used
a gravity model of FDI to establish this position. Eaton and Tamura (1994)
ﬁnd that Japan is more open to U.S. exports, but less open to FDI than most
countries in Western Europe. Eaton and Tamura (1996) conﬁrm this ﬁnding
using a gravity-type speciﬁcation generated from a model of technological
adoption via either exports or FDI.
This paper contributes to the literature by employing a theoretical benchmark
for multilateral FDI levels to evaluate Japan’s FDI performance. The next
section discusses existing models of FDI and identiﬁes their limitations for
assessing FDI performance in an international perspective. Section 3 describes
our model that posits FDI as an outcome of management teams making bids on
2production units. Section 4 details the data we use and explains why a model
of acquisitions is appropriate for modelling FDI. Section 5 evaluates Japan’s
inward and outward FDI position relative to the theoretical predictions at
diﬀerent points in time. The ﬁnal section summarizes the results and addresses
policy implications.
2 Existing Models of FDI
Until 1984, the academic study of FDI consisted mainly of verbal frameworks
constructed by management professors. Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984)
launched the modern formal economics literature on FDI. Helpman (1984)
viewed FDI through the lens of factor proportions theory and emphasized the
separation of the ﬁrm into two activities, one appropriate for skill-abundant
countries and the other best carried out in skill-scarce countries. Markusen
(1984) modelled FDI as a way that ﬁrms could achieve multi-plant economies
while avoiding trade costs. In the literature that followed, the Helpman (1984)
and Markusen (1984) approaches came to be known as vertical and horizontal
FDI. In his monograph summarizing the FDI literature of the last decade,
Markusen (2002, p. 5) deﬁnes vertical FDI as investments that “geographically
fragment the production process by stages of production” and horizontal FDI
as “foreign production of products and services roughly similar to those that
the ﬁrm produces for its own market.”
Markusen (2002) also develops and promotes his “knowledge-capital” model
that integrates both vertical and horizontal motives for FDI. Since there is
abundant anecdotal evidence of both motives in practice, the knowledge cap-
ital model seems eminently sensible. But the realism associated with consid-
ering both motives in a general equilibrium setting with oligopoly and free
entry comes at a considerable cost. The knowledge capital model comprises
over 40 equations in which there are inequalities with associated non-negative
variables (chieﬂy, the numbers of various types of ﬁrms). It can only be solved
numerically using Rutherford’s mixed complementarity problem solving pro-
gram, GAMS. Eaton and Tamura (1996) also must use simulations to generate
predictions about the level of FDI in their two-country, general equilibrium
model of FDI.
Both the knowledge capital model and the Eaton and Tamura model con-
sider only two countries. The world has 100 times as many. This leads to
two problems. First, do the two-country predictions extend to the N country
case? Second, even if they do extend, while they could be useful for predicting
patterns for a particular source country relative to diﬀerent host countries,
can they be used, for example, to determine what Japan’s overall FDI levels
should be relative to the United States? To identify a concrete issue regard-
3ing extension to higher dimensions, the knowledge capital model predicts that
horizontal FDI will be high when the two countries have similar factor endow-
ments. This makes sense in the case of, say, Canada and the United States.
However, one presumably does not see high horizontal FDI in the case of less
developed countries with similar factor endowments.
Markusen’s theory focuses on a ﬁrm that deploys the same “blueprints” (de-
signs for products and processes) at multiple production sites. The approach
does not explicitly consider multinationals that expand by acquiring existing
ﬁrms with their own established blueprints. The data (described in section 4)
suggest that the majority of FDI in the world takes the form of acquisitions.
3 The Dartboard Model of FDI
Here we provide an abbreviated and simpliﬁed description of a model that
is fully developed in Head and Ries (2004). It generates predictions for each
country’s share of world FDI based on its economic size and location. The
model explicitly considers the acquisition decision, and we also allow for an
arbitrary number of diﬀerent sized countries.
The model takes its inspiration from the notion in corporate ﬁnance of the
market for corporate control, described by Jensen and Ruback (1983) as an
“arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate
resources.” The name “dartboard” derives from the Ellison and Glaeser (1997)
approach to quantifying geographic concentration of industries. In our case,
darts correspond to investors whereas areas on the dartboard correspond to
the assets available in each country.
The basic idea of our model is as follows. Management teams search for acqui-
sition opportunities throughout the world (at home and abroad). The amount
of outward FDI for a country depends on the number of foreign acquisitions
done by home management teams. FDI will will be a function of the number of
management teams, the amount of potential foreign acquisitions, and the like-
lihood that home management teams bid successfully on a foreign acquisition
target. The model speciﬁes each of these three elements for each country.
The intuition underlying the model is conveyed by Figure 1. Management
teams are represented as darts whereas the number of acquisition targets by
areas on a map. Larger countries have more management teams (darts) and
larger countries have more potential acquisitions (area on the map). The ﬁgure
depicts both the number of darts and the areas on the dartboard as propor-
tional to the sizes of these economies in 2002. The probability of acquiring


















Darts proportional to number of management teams
Areas proportional to number of 
controllable production units
Fig. 1. The dartboard metaphor
at the map will land within that country. Two basic ideas are demonstrated
here. First, large countries will do more FDI because they have more man-
agement teams. Second, large countries will have more inward FDI because
they host more acquisition targets. A more subtle idea is also portrayed in the
ﬁgure—large countries will have a high proportion of their darts land within
their country owing to their large size. These domestic acquisitions will not
be counted as FDI. As we will see formally later, the implication is that small
economies have FDI levels that are large relative to the size of their economies.
Each country i has Mi management teams that bid to control production
units. There are Mw =
P
i Mi management teams worldwide. Management
teams from a given source country i have a collective probability that they
will gain control of a given production unit in j denoted as πij. Deﬁning Kj as
the value of production units in country j, we can express source country i’s
FDI stock in host country j, Fij, as
Fij = πijKj. (1)
In the following subsections, we show two diﬀerent ways of specifying πij.
53.1 The neutral dartboard
In the simplest version of the model, each bidding management team is sym-
metric and has an equal probability of winning equal to 1/Mw. Summing
across teams, the collective probability of any team from country i winning
a particular unit in country j is πij = Mi/Mw. Substitution yields a simple





Summing over all foreign destination countries j we obtain an equation for







Kj = (Mi/Mw)(Kw−Ki) = (Mi/Mw)Kw(1−Ki/Kw).
(3)
A destination country’s aggregate inward FDI can be obtained by summing







Kj = (Kj/Mw)(Mw − Mj) = Kj(1 − Mj/Mw).
(4)












We now introduce lower case notation to denote country-level variables ex-
pressed as shares of their worldwide values. Thus, let country i’s share of
management teams be mi = Mi/Mw and country j’s share of available pro-
duction units be kj = Kj/Kw. FDI shares are denoted fI
j = Fwj/Fww for
inward stocks and fO
i = Fiw/Fww for outward stocks. Using this notation we

















These equations oﬀer predictions for a country’s inward and outward FDI as
a function of production units and management teams.
A key question for the empirical estimation is how to obtain measures of
these two determinants. In Head and Ries (2004), we experimented with using
estimates of national capital stocks as Ki. However, many countries do not
6have capital stock data and it is not available in the Penn World Tables after
1992. We extended existing series using World Development Indicators data on
capital formation and an assumed depreciation rate. However, we found that
shares of capital obtained in this manner were very highly correlated with
other measures of economic size that were available for large sets of countries.
In Head and Ries (2004), we considered measuring management teams, Mi,
as proportional to workers with post-secondary degrees and a human capital
measure constructed from Mincer regression returns to education. As with
estimated capital stocks, these measures suﬀer from coverage issues—the data
are not available for all countries over a long time horizon. Moreover, they
generate problematic results. China and India have very large levels of workers
with post-secondary degrees relative to their economic size. In the context of
our model, this implies that they have a large number of management teams
and would do a large amount of outward FDI, an outcome that is inconsistent
with the data.
Lacking attractive measures of Mi and Ki for the whole sample we wish to
examine, we consider instead a simplifying assumption that both management
teams and production units are distributed internationally in proportion to
the overall size of the economy, denoted Si. This symmetry assumption greatly
simpliﬁes the algebra. After substituting economy size shares, denoted si =













j is the Herﬁndahl concentration index for the worldwide
distribution of economic activity.
The formula reveals that a country’s share of world FDI is not simply equal
to its share of the world economy, si. When other studies compare FDI per-
formance across countries based on FDI to GDP ratios, they implicitly are as-
suming that FDI should be proportional to economy size, implying FDI shares
equal to GDP shares. Our derivation shows that there needs to an adjustment
for country size. Because it is available for almost all countries through 2002
and probably among the most consistently measured aggregates, we use Gross
National Income (GNI) as our measure of economy size, Si, in the empirical
implementation. We ﬁnd that H is .10 in 1980 and gradually rises to .14 by
2002. 1 Thus, for countries such as the United States with s = .33 > H = .14,
FDI shares are predicted to be less than income shares. Indeed, in 2002 the
U.S. benchmark is .26 < .33. Its actual shares of inward and outward FDI
stocks are even lower: .19 and .22, respectively. Since all countries except the
U.S. have s < H in 2002, they should have higher FDI shares than GNI shares.
1 Note that the corresponding number of equal-sized countries, 1/H, therefore
declines from 10 to 7 over this period.
7Coincidentally in 2002 Japan’s GNI share of .13 lies just under H. Thus,
our neutral benchmark predicts that for Japan only the FDI share should be
roughly equal to the income share. As we will show, Japan’s outward and
especially its inward FDI shares (.048 and .008 respectively) are considerably
lower than its GNI shares. There are many possible explanations. Our paper
focusses on an explanation based on Japan’s geography. As noted by Deardorﬀ
(2004), “Japan is farther from its nearest developed-country trading partner
than any other developed country.” Furthermore, Japan has a small area rela-
tive to the size of its economy. In the next section we show that the dartboard
model can be modiﬁed to take into account the inﬂuence of geography.
3.2 The gravitational dartboard
The model has so far deliberately excluded all sorts of frictions that inﬂuence
the pattern of FDI. This simpliﬁcation yields a remarkably compact expression
for FDI stocks. However there are good reasons to believe that teams will be
more likely to obtain control of production units if they are relatively nearby.
This is because the prospective bidder recognizes the high costs of monitoring
production units that are long distances away from the management team’s
head oﬃce. Without adequate monitoring, there would be high agency costs.
Management teams should anticipate these costs and reduce their bids for
faraway units accordingly. Referring back to Figure 1, the intuition is that
darts of a given color are attracted to areas of the same color. Thus, most
darts will land in or near to the source country.
Head and Ries (2004) show that if bids are inversely proportionate to distance,






where ` indexes the countries (including j) from which j consumers purchase
goods. 2 The speciﬁcation shows that the probability that management teams
in country i’s will make an acquisition in country j depends on its size (number
of management teams) discounted by the distance between i and j relative to
the distance adjusted size of all other potential suitors. Thus, not only does
size play a role, but so does a country’s geographic location relative to all
other countries.
2 Head and Ries (2004) derive a more general speciﬁcation where distance is raised
to the power θ. Searching across all θs between −1 and 2, we found that θ ≈ 1 ﬁts
the data best. Here we simplify the notation by assuming θ = 1.
8Now we can express bilateral FDI from source country j to host country i as




Algebraic manipulation yields cost i’s share of world inward FDI stock is
f
I
i = Fwi/Fww =
si(1 − πii)
1 − ˜ H
.
where ˜ H ≡
P
j sjπjj. Note that if distance eﬀects were very small, then πjj ≈ sj
and ˜ H ≈ H ≡
P
j s2
j. Home i’s share of world outward FDI stock
f
O
i = Fiw/Fww =
si(Ai − πii)





Note that the expressions for shares of inward and outward investment cease
to be symmetric unless Ai happens to be one. Outward shares exceed inward
shares when Ai > 1 and vice-versa for Ai < 1. We can think of Ai as country
i’s “geographic advantage” as a source for outward investment. Ai tends to-
wards one when distance costs are very small. We will observe later that A is
considerably larger than one for Japan and thus it is predicted to have larger
outward FDI shares than inward shares.
4 Data
The model requires data on foreign direct investment, economy size, and dis-
tance between and within countries. As described below, we collect data for
various sources to obtain a panel data set for 181 countries from 1980–2002.
Missing data and changes in the number of countries cause the actual sample
size to vary across years.
4.1 FDI data
FDI occurs when investors in one country establish or acquire a signiﬁcant por-
tion of the assets in an enterprise in another country. In principle “signiﬁcant”
means enough to gain an active voice in the management of the enterprise. In
practice, the IMF deﬁnes “signiﬁcant” as more than 10%. Thus, FDI involves
cross-border ownership and some degree of control.
9We obtain data on FDI ﬂows and stocks from United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Aggregate inward and outward FDI data
are available at h www.unctad.org/fdistatistics i. The site does not provide
bilateral FDI data.
Flows of FDI are deﬁned as capital provided by a foreign direct investor to
an enterprise resident in another economy. It comprises three components:
equity, retained earnings, and loans. Equity and retained earnings depend on
the equity stake of the foreign parent whereas loans measure the indebted-
ness of aﬃliates to the parent. The ﬂows of these components are reported in
Balance of Payments compiled by the IMF. Since by deﬁnition FDI is capital
provided by foreign direct investors, it excludes changes in the equity posi-
tion of a parent in its foreign aﬃliates that are not ﬁnanced by the parent.
However, the accounts do record changes in retained earnings. Although, no
cross-border capital ﬂow actually occurs, the accounts assume that earnings
are repatriated (a payment for ﬁnancial services) and then sent back to the
aﬃliate (an increase in direct investment).
FDI stocks reported by UNCTAD originate from a variety of sources. If pos-
sible, the data come from national sources. In the case of Canada and Japan,
the stocks reﬂect cumulative balance of payments transactions adjusted for
exchange rate changes and reclassiﬁcation as reported in the International
Monetary Fund’s International Investment Position. When data cannot be
obtained from national sources, UNCTAD uses data in Balance of Payments
or International Investment Position. The time series on outward stock is
inﬂuenced by changes in the source of the data. For example, Japan’s outward
FDI stock reported in the 2003 World Investment Report is based on IMF
data for 1980-1996 and national sources from 1996–2002. Inconsistencies in
the time series data can also arise when the IMF revises how it deﬁnes and
reports information on direct investment.
UNCTAD also supplies data on cross-border acquisitions of equity stakes that
exceed 10% where the value corresponds to total transaction amount at the
time of closure of the deal. These numbers are based on original data supplied
by Thompson Financial Securities Data Company. United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (2000, p. 104) discusses four reasons why this
merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction data is not a subset of bilateral
FDI ﬂows. 3 First, they include funds raised domestically and internationally
(FDI includes only the amounts provided by the foreign investor). Second,
the M&A data reﬂect gross investment and do not deduct any disinvestment.
Third, the UNCTAD data record M&A capital as being paid out in a single
year even though this is not necessarily the case. Fourth, M&A includes any
3 International Monetary Fund (2003, p. 32) also discusses the signiﬁcant diﬀerences
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(share financed by parent)
Equity purchase of 
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(3rd-party financing)
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Fig. 2. Overlapping deﬁnitions of FDI and cross-border M&A
acquisitions involving ﬁrms whose owners’ nationalities diﬀer regardless of the
residence of the target and acquiring ﬁrm (whereas FDI requires that a direct
investor provide capital to an enterprise resident in another economy).
Figure 2 is a Venn diagram portraying the sources of overlap and diﬀerences be-
tween FDI and M&A data. 4 Both include equity purchases of foreign-resident
entities ﬁnanced by the parent company. Investment activities subsequent to
the initial purchase as well as greenﬁeld investments are reﬂected in FDI data
but not M&A data. On the other hand, M&A data include any third-party ﬁ-
nancing of the acquisition and acquisitions of domestic-resident, foreign-owned
entities.
For our present analysis, we focus on FDI stocks rather than M&As for two
reasons. First, M&A and FDI ﬂow data are highly correlated, but FDI data are
available for a longer period (starting in 1980 as opposed to 1988 for M&As)
and larger set of countries. Second, as mentioned before, M&A data record
aggregate purchases and do not track divestitures or other equity changes.
We focus on stocks because our model makes predictions on the aggregate
amount of foreign assets controlled by ﬁrms. We note that a more general
interpretation of our model could apply to greenﬁeld (new plant) investment.
4 Venn diagrams portray the common and distinct elements between two sets of
information.
11Table 1
M&A transactions and FDI ﬂows: Correlations and ratios for 1988–2002
M&A Sales:Inward FDI M&A Purchases:Outward FDI
correlation ratio correlation ratio
EU 0.97 0.70 0.98 0.69
U.S. 0.97 1.02 0.84 0.75
Canada 0.97 1.04 0.92 0.90
Japan 0.85 1.34 0.66 0.29
Note: Ratios sum 15 years of transactions in numerator (M&A) and
denominator (FDI).
Instead of thinking about the acquisition of companies, consider investors to
be bidding for plots of land to build greenﬁeld investments. As long as there
are assets that are not supplied with a perfectly elastic supply curve, the FDI
decision may be modelled as a bidding competition between diﬀerent investors
and thereby would be consistent with our model.
Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 display M&A and FDI ﬂows from 1988–2002 for four
regions: EU, U.S., Canada, and Japan. Each ﬁgure contains four lines that
should be compared as pairs: outward FDI ﬂow with foreign M&A purchases
and inward FDI ﬂow with foreign M&A sales. Clearly FDI and M&A are
closely related. For the EU, U.S., and Canada, not only are M&A and FDI
close in levels, they “bounce around” in a similar pattern. The relationship is
poorer in the case of Japan. Japan’s outward investment is much lower than
its inward investment (note the data are plotted on a log scale) and M&As
appear to be less closely correlated with FDI. In two years, 1989 and 1990,
inward investment into Japan is negative and cannot be plotted on a log scale.
The relationship between the data is summarized in Table 1. The ﬁrst two
columns pertain to inward FDI and M&A sales (sales of domestic ﬁrms to
foreigners) and the last two to outward FDI and M&A purchases (by domestic
ﬁrms). The correlations are based on the 1988–2002 period whereas the ratios
are the ratio of aggregate 1988–2002 M&A transactions to aggregate 1988–
2002 FDI ﬂows. The table reveals that M&As appear to account for most of
the FDI activity in the EU, U.S. and Canada–the correlations and ratios are
high. For Japan, M&A accounts for much of inward FDI but has a less tight
relationship to outward FDI, suggesting greenﬁeld (new plant) investment
plays an important role in outward FDI for Japan in the 1988–2002 period.
Japan has been viewed as country being hostile to corporate takeovers. Two
impediments to FDI underlie low foreign acquisitions in Japan. First, there
is substantial cross-shareholding in Japan that prevents ﬁrms from acquiring









































Fig. 3. FDI and M&A, European Union














































Fig. 4. FDI and M&A, United States









































Fig. 5. FDI and M&A, Canada






























































Fig. 6. FDI and M&A, Japan
14majority stakes in Japanese enteprises. A famous case in point is T. Boone
Pickens’ attempt to have a management voice in Koito Manufacturing in 1999.
Despite having a 20% stake in the Japanese company, he was thwarted in his
attempt to gain a seat on the Board of Directors by large Japanese corporate
shareholders. Morck and Nakamura (2004) describe the history of corporate
control in Japan and explain how small blocks of shares held by keiretsu ﬁrms
summed to majority stakes that eﬀectively blocked hostile takeovers in Japan.
In addition to cross-shareholding, a second impediment to acquisitions is a
diﬃcult administrative and legal environment for acquiring ﬁrms in Japan.
However, Figure 6 reveals that M&A sales increased rapidly in Japan in the
latter half of the 1990s. This may be attributed to eﬀorts by the Japanese gov-
ernment to ease obstacles to acquisitions and other eﬀorts to promote inward
FDI. The Japanese Investment Council was created in 1994 and is chaired by
the Prime Minister and membership includes the Ministers of all the important
ministries. A Council initiative to improve the M&A environment has led to
changes in administrative and legal procedures aimed at providing additional
means through which to acquire Japanese companies. Examples include the
introduction of share-for-share exchanges (kabushiki kokan) and share switches
(kabushiki iten) in 1999. Large foreign takeovers include Ripplewood Holdings
purchase of the failed Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Wal-Mart’s stake
in Seiyu Ltd. that now stands at 38%, and Roche’s acquisition of Chugai
Pharmaceuticals.
Figure 7 shows country shares of world outward FDI relative to shares of
world inward FDI on a log scale using 2002 stocks. The 45 degree line repre-
sents the two shares being equal. The ﬁgure reveals that many countries have
low levels of outward FDI relative to their levels of inward FDI. This is not a
ringing endorsement for our symmetric model which predicts the two should
be equal (and thus line up along the 45 degree line). It is small, developing
countries that tend to have low levels of outward FDI relative to inward FDI.
Presumably, they do not possess management teams capable of acquiring for-
eign production units. Countries with large outward shares do, however, tend
to have large inward shares. An exception is Japan which has a much higher
outward share than inward share. The gravitational benchmark breaks the
symmetry between outward and inward FDI and as we will see later, predicts
larger outward shares than inward shares for Japan.
4.2 National Incomes and Distances
We use gross national income (GNI) from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators expressed in current U.S. dollars as our measure of economy
size Si to construct country shares si.




























































Fig. 7. The relationship between inward and outward FDI in 2002
Following standard practice for gravity equations for bilateral trade, we mea-
sure distance using the great circle formula applied to the major city (usually
the capital) of each country. The measurement of distance within nations poses
both conceptual and practical problems. Nevertheless some measure must be
employed since it is unreasonable in this context to think of nations as points
where each bidder would have zero distance from each target. We use an ap-
proximation based on a highly artiﬁcial geography: countries are shaped like
disks with targets uniformly distributed across the plane. Bidders’ headquar-
ters are assumed to be concentrated in the center. Integration reveals that the
average distance from bidder to target equals (2/3)
q
A/π, where A represents
the area of the country. The international and intranational distances calcu-
lated in this manner are all available in an Excel spreadsheet on the CEPII
website hwww.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm i.
5 Japan’s FDI stocks in international perspective
The dartboard model makes predictions for each country’s share of world
inward and outward FDI. Figures 8 and 9 show the relationship of this bench-
mark to inward and outward FDI shares for the year 2002 based on the grav-
itational dartboard model predictions. The vertical axis reﬂects actual FDI


































































Fig. 8. Inward FDI stocks relative to the benchmark, 2002



































































Fig. 9. Outward FDI stocks relative to the benchmark, 2002
17shares and the horizontal access the benchmark with the points correspond-
ing to individual countries. The data are plotted on a log scale. We identify
Japan in the ﬁgure and a few other countries (using their two-letter ISO ab-
breviations). If the benchmark predicted actual FDI perfectly, all points would
lie on the 45-degree line. Figure 8 contains 153 countries compared to 126 in
Figure 9 because many more countries host FDI than invest abroad. 5
We observe that the model predicts inward shares much better than outward
shares. The problem with the outward share predictions is that poor countries
do very little outward FDI, suggesting that using GNI shares as the proxy
for shares of management teams might not be a good approximation for these
countries. Alternatively, it might be that management teams from poor coun-
tries systematically underbid teams from richer countries.
Researchers conventionally compare countries’ direct investment performance
based on the ratio of FDI to the size of the economy. Using that approach,
Japan’s outward FDI stock is 8% of its national income. The median (in 2002,
for 126 countries with positive outward stocks) is 3%. From that perspective,
Japan looks like a good performer. However, its share of world outward FDI
is less than 5%, when its neutral benchmark share is 13%. Thus the question
to be answered is why Japan does so little outward FDI, rather than why it
does so much. Part of the answer is its geography. As a densely packed and
remote country, our gravitational benchmark leads us to expect a lower share
than the neutral benchmark. However, the adjustment for distance only lowers
the outward benchmark to 9%. Thus, Japan’s low outward FDI is a puzzle,
though the gap relative to the benchmark is not as severe as it is for inward
FDI.
The benchmark is a good predictor of U.S. (us) and Canadian (ca) FDI stocks
and also does well for many European nations. Hong Kong (hk) has more
inward and outward FDI than predicted, whereas India (in) under-performs
in both cases.
Figure 10 portrays Japan’s FDI performance from 1980 to 2002. It shows
Japan’s actual inward and outward FDI shares as well and the neutral and
gravitational dartboard predictions. We see that the outward gravitational
benchmark for Japan is considerably higher than the inward gravitational
benchmark. Until the late 1990s, Japan’s outward FDI share tracks pretty
closely to the gravitational benchmark but has fallen short in recent years. Its
inward share is below its gravitational benchmark and the two are converging.
Thus, while Japan has increased its inward stock of FDI in levels in recent
years (see Figure 6), its share of world inward FDI remains constant and low.
We also plot the prediction of the neutral benchmark in the ﬁgure and this line
5 The log scale used in these ﬁgures makes it impossible to show countries with
zeros.



































Fig. 10. Japan’s inward and outward FDI performance, 2002
(applying to both inward and outward FDI) is above the other benchmarks.
It is clear that the gravitational benchmark provides a much better ﬁt to the
Japanese actual FDI than does the neutral benchmark. 6 This is because the
gravitational model recognizes Japan’s remoteness to other economies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess Japan’s FDI in the context of a model of FDI as
an outcome of the market for corporate control. Management teams bid on
controllable production units located both at home and abroad and the bid
amounts decline with the distance between management and production units.
Japan, due to its remote location, has lower shares of world FDI than what
would be expected based on its share of world income.
While the model we apply explicitly considers acquisitions, we use it to predict
a country’s share of FDI. Our investigation of FDI and merger and acquisition
data reveals that M&A data accounts for much of FDI over the last 15 years
6 Head and Ries (2004) report evidence establishing that the gravitational bench-
mark provides a superior ﬁt than the neutral benchmark for the sample of countries
as a whole.
19and the two series are very highly correlated. However, FDI’s similarity with
M&A activity is lower for Japan than the EU, U.S., and Canada. Even in cases
where M&As do not account for a large share of a country’s FDI, as is the
case for Japan, our model is still appropriate if greenﬁeld investment involves
bidding for an asset in ﬁxed supply. This would be the case if management
teams bid on highly prized greenﬁeld locations.
A country’s FDI performance needs to be evaluated relative to a norm de-
rived from economic theory. Our comparison of multilateral FDI shares to our
benchmark for a large number of countries reveals that the gravitation dart-
board model ﬁts the data surprisingly well given that it relies solely on data
on economy size and geography. The dartboard benchmark corroborates the
conventional wisdom that Japan’s inward FDI is very low. This is the case
even when one takes into account the size and location of Japan’s economy.
Although Japan’s stock of inward FDI has doubled since 1997, its share of
world FDI remains under 1%. Recent Japanese eﬀorts to facilitate M&As are
probably integral for elevating its inward FDI towards the benchmark value
of around 4%. Our ﬁndings for Japanese outward investment performance are
somewhat surprising, given the many famous multinationals headquartered in
Japan. While outward shares surpassed the benchmark from 1989 to 1993,
Japan has remained below the benchmark since 1994. Japan’s substantial
under-performance as a source of outward FDI is a phenomenon that calls out
for an explanation.
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